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                                                                 Abstract  
This paper builds an overlapping generations household economy model with learning by 
doing effect in unskilled work. We study the relative effectiveness of child labour ban and 
education subsidy on schooling. We find some interesting results- the time path of schooling 
is oscillating but convergent in nature; a fall in child wage does not necessarily increase 
steady state schooling; if unskilled adult wage is sufficiently small, education subsidy is more 
effective in enhancing schooling than banning child labour and a child labour ban that 
increases steady state schooling may not be accompanied by increase in utility level of the 
household. 
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 1. Introduction 
This paper builds a theoretical model with learning by doing effect in unskilled work. This 
paper examines the relative effectiveness of two types of domestic policies to combat child 
labour-a child labour ban and an education subsidy. Although the incidence of child labour 
has steadily declined over the last decade the ILO estimates show that the number of child 
workers across the globe is still quite high. According to the ILO estimates, in 2012, there 
were about 168 million child labourers in the world, of whom more than two thirds (120 
million) were in the age group 5 to 14 years old. In 2012, the largest child labourers was in 
Asia and the Pacific (77.7 million), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa with 59.0 million, Latin 
America and the Caribbean with 12.5 million and MENA with 9.2 million. In relative terms, 
Sub-Saharan Africa ranks highest. About 1 in 5 children was in child labour in the region. 
Thus tackling the problem of child labour remains a challenging issue for the developing 
countries across the world. Both domestic as well as international policies may be undertaken 
to reduce the incidence of child labour. However in this paper we restrict our analysis only to 
domestic policies. A number of theoretical papers have dealt with the effectiveness of 
domestic policies to reduce child labour. The pioneer work on child labour by Basu and Van 
(1998) shows that in case of multiple equilibria in the labour market, a total ban on child 
labour can take the economy from bad equilibrium to good equilibrium. All working class 
households will be better off. But if there is only one equilibrium, a total ban could harm 
worker households and also benefit them. A partial ban may not always reduce child labour 
but may reduce only child wage. However utility of the worker household may or may not 
increase. According to Baland and Robinson (2000), small ban on child labour can be Pareto 
improving. A ban on child labour reduces the supply of child labour while increasing the 
supply of adult labour in the future. As a result, current wages of both adults and children are 
likely to rise and future wages are likely to fall. Thus while children’s utility is likely to rise 
in most cases, parental welfare will increase only when the effect on current wages 
dominates. The paper by Dessy and Pallage (2001) states that compulsory bans on child 
labour will help sending signals to investors that investment in human capital will be made in 
the near future and thus skilled labour is likely to be available. Ban or compulsory education 
will be counterproductive if the cost of investment is very high. Instead a policy that 
subsidizes technology and imposes compulsory education can help to move the economy 
from bad equilibrium to a good one. Emerson and Knabb (2006) shows that ban on child 
labour and/or compulsory education can actually reduce dynastic welfare, increase poverty 
and further accentuate income inequality within society. Banning child labour may not bring 
about positive outcomes for a poor household. According to P.Ranjan (1999), banning child 
labour, even if perfectly enforceable, reduces welfare of the poor households who want their 
children to work. Another paper by the same author-P.Ranjan (2001) states that if sending a 
child to work is an optimal decision for a poor household, a legislative ban reduces the 
welfare of the households as it imposes a constraint on the choices of the household. Few 
papers have dealt with the policy issues on harmful forms of child labour. According to 
Rogers and Swinnerton (2002), a ban on exploitative child labour leads to increase in the 
wages of children working in the competitive sector and firm profits, even for firms that do 
not exploit child workers, fall. At the macroeconomic level, a ban has ambiguous effects i.e. 
child employment and aggregate output may rise or fall. Dessy and Pallage (2005) states that 
a ban on worst forms of child labour in poor countries is likely to be welfare reducing as 
these forms of labour have important economic role to play. The wages earned by the 
children by working in these jobs help in human capital accumulation. So by denying them 
work, they are being relegated to an even worse situation. Dinopoulos and Zhao (2007), in 
their paper on globalisation, shows that a ban on child labour benefits adult unskilled workers 
but hurts adult skilled workers.   
There are relatively less works done to study the impact of education subsidy on child labour. 
According to Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2003), a rise in the education subsidy may 
produce counterproductive results on the supply of child labour in the urban area. Moreover it 
may raise the level of urban unemployment of adults even when adult labour and child labour 
are not substitutes to each other. The average income of the urban poor families may also 
decrease as a consequence. Chaudhuri (2004) states that the effects of increase in education 
subsidy on child labour depends on relative strength of two effects-namely labour re-
allocation effect and the contradictory effect which exerts a downward pressure on the 
incidence of child labour. Mukherjee and Sinha (2006) argue in favour of education subsidy 
in improving school attendance. According to Estevez (2011), an education subsidy will 
reduce the incidence of child labour. The education subsidy will not only increase the 
household income but will also indirectly increase the unskilled wage. 
There are some empirical papers that study the impact of domestic policies on child labour. 
Fabre and Pallage (2011) works within a dynamic, general equilibrium model calibrated to 
South Africa in the 1990s. It shows that in an economy with idiosyncratic shocks to adult 
employment, child labour ban deprives the households of an important way of smoothing 
consumption. Schultz (2004) evaluates the performance of Progresa (provides education 
grants to poor mothers) program in rural Mexico and has concluded that there has been 
significant reduction in child work for those families who have been induced by the program 
to enrol their child in school. However the magnitude of the response cannot offset more than 
a fifth of the total consumption gains associated with the program grants. The paper by 
Ravallion and Wodon (2000) studies the effects of a targeted enrolment subsidy on children’s 
labour force participation and school enrolment in rural Bangladesh. Results suggest that the 
enrolment subsidy reduced the incidence of child labour but this effect accounts for a small 
proportion of the increase in school enrolment. So reduction of child labour not necessarily 
implies increase in schooling. Krueger and Donohue (2005) calibrate their model to USA 
data circa 1880 and conclude that introducing free education results in substantial welfare 
gains, whereas a child labour ban induces small welfare losses. 
However none of the theoretical papers so far have studied the effects of ban and education 
subsidy on schooling of child labour in the presence of learning by doing effect in unskilled 
work. This paper attempts to fill this gap. 
It is well known that workers are able to improve their productivity by repetition of the same 
work done. Dessy and Pallage (2005), in their paper on worst forms of child labour, have 
considered the learning by doing effect but in the human capital accumulation function. There 
are many other papers which have emphasized on the learning by doing effect. However 
these papers do not deal with the issue of child labour1. In the present paper individuals earn 
an extra income as adult in the unskilled sector if they had worked as child labour in their 
young age. This is how learning by doing effect works in our paper. Learning by doing often 
occurs through apprenticeship and in real life apprenticeship is found mostly in informal or 
unskilled sector. Apprenticeship provides vocational education in many fields e.g. carpentry, 
farming, masonry, fishing, poultry where knowledge is transmitted through prolonged 
practice rather than acquiring formal knowledge base. According to World Employment 
Report 1998-99-“In Kenya, there are more apprentices enrolled in the informal sector than 
trainees in the formal sector”, while “in Egypt, over 80% of craftsmen in the construction 
sector acquire their skills through traditional apprenticeship.” According to the report, child 
labour is common in the field of apprenticeship. According to ILO’s report on Employment 
Sector (2008), apprenticeship has been providing the traditional solution for developing and 
financing vocational skills of young people in poor societies. Today, apprenticeship in the 
informal economy represents the main road to skills development in most developing 
countries. Estimations suggest that 80% of the skills imparted in the informal economy in 
West Africa are transferred through apprenticeship. In Benin, in 2005, approximately 
2000,000 young apprentices were trained, which represents ten times as many apprentices 
than students in vocational and technical education. But there are very few child labour 
papers that capture learning by doing effect. 
The present paper builds an overlapping generations model of household economy consisting 
of a skilled sector and an unskilled sector. If one individual is employed in skilled sector she 
gets wage proportional to human capital whereas unskilled sector gives a fixed return and a 
positive learning by doing effect generated from working in her childhood. Expected future 
earning of child is included in the parental utility function and parental choice of schooling 
vis-a-vis child work is considered. We consider the case where parents work in unskilled 
sector. This paper attempts to understand the effects of child labour ban and education 
subsidy on steady state schooling of child labour and effects of ban on utility level of the 
household. Moreover this paper studies the relative effectiveness of child labour ban and 
education subsidy in improving schooling of the child.  
We find in this model that there exists a critical level of parental human capital beyond which 
schooling of child becomes positive and another critical level of parental human capital 
beyond which schooling of child becomes equal to one i.e. there is no child labour . The time 
path of schooling is convergent but oscillating in nature2.  
We find that steady state schooling increases with increase in the responsiveness of skilled 
wage to human capital, increase in parental level of human capital, increase in the probability 
                                                           
1
 See e.g. Lucas (1988), Mao (2012), Parente (1994), Hippel and Tyre (1993) etc. 
2
 Zhang (2015), Zhang (2014), Croix and Licandro (1999), Croix (2001) have found oscillations in human capital 
accumulation but in different context. 
of getting employment in the skilled sector, fall in schooling cost. As child wage falls, steady 
state schooling increases only if unskilled adult wage exceeds the sum of subsistence 
consumption expenditure and schooling cost of the household. Otherwise fall in child wage 
may or may not increase steady state schooling of the child. While analysing the dynamics 
we find that in the presence of learning by doing effect on unskilled income the time path of 
schooling is oscillating but convergent. Comparing the effects of ban and education subsidy 
on steady state schooling we get the result that if unskilled adult wage is sufficiently small, 
education subsidy is more effective in enhancing schooling than banning child labour. A 
child labour ban that increases steady state schooling may not necessarily increase utility 
level of the household. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3 
describes the short run equilibrium when adults work in the unskilled sector. Section 4 
discusses the dynamics of schooling. In section 5 comparisons between effects of ban and 
subsidy are being made. Section 6 analyses the impact of ban on utility level of the 
household. Concluding remarks are made in section 7.  
 
2. The Model 
We consider an economy that consists of identical households in overlapping generations 
framework3. Each household consists of one adult and one child. We consider two parents as 
one adult and two children as one child. The economy consists of two sectors- a skilled sector 
and an unskilled sector. In first period agents are children. They may either work in unskilled 
sector or go to school. In second period, the agent on reaching adulthood, even though she is 
educated, may not get job in the skilled sector. Job in skilled sector is subject to uncertainty. 
If she does not get job in skilled sector she gets absorbed in the unskilled sector. If one 
individual is employed in skilled sector she gets wage proportional to human capital whereas 
unskilled sector gives a fixed return and an extra income depending on if she had worked as 
child labour. The adult or the parent decides the time allocation of her child between work 
and schooling. Utility function of the adult depends on family consumption and expected 
earnings of the child in future4. Adult forms expectations over whether she believes that the 
child will get job in skilled sector on becoming adult5. This forecasting depends on present 
level of unemployment in the economy.  
Following Glomm (1997), we assume parental choice of human capital investment. The adult 
decides how much time her child would devote to work in the unskilled sector and how much 
                                                           
3
 Overlapping generations framework have been adopted by Becker and Tomes (1979), Acemoglu and Pischke (2000), 
Glomm (1997), Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) and many 
 
4
 In Mukherjee and Sinha (2006), aggregate current consumption and the child’s future earning enter in the parent’s utility 
function.  According to Genicot and Ray (2010), people’s aspirations for their future well being (or that of their children) 
affect their incentives to invest. Expectations of the parents from their children affect their utility. 
 
5
 In Emerson and Knabb (2007), households form expectations over whether they believe the government will keep its 
promise to implement the social security program to eradicate child labour. 
 
time for schooling by maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint. In first period, time 
devoted to schooling is denoted by ‘st-1’ and that to work is ‘1- st-1’. Working generates 
positive learning by doing effects denoted by ‘(1- st-1)h’which helps her to earn a higher wage 
in future on joining the unskilled sector.
 
Here h	 is the minimum level of human capital 
possessed by the child even if she does not attend school. In second period the adult sends her 
child to school for‘st’ units of time and for the remaining ‘(1-st)’ units of time, the child is 
employed in the unskilled sector. Wages earned by the adult and the child constitute the total 
income of the household. If the child joins the skilled sector, on becoming adult, she gets a 
wage in the skilled sector which is a fixed proportion of the human capital possessed by her 
(δht)6. In unskilled sector the adult gets a fixed return ‘A+ (1- st-1)h’ where‘(1- st-1)h ’ denotes 
positive learning by doing effect generated from working as a child. Child, by working in the 
unskilled sector also get a fixed return which is less than the return obtained by the adults 
from unskilled sector. 
Like Moav (2005), this paper assumes that human capital evolution is independent of 
physical capital. 
Suppose human capital accumulation function of a child is assumed to take the following 
form7: 
ht+1 = bstht+ h,                                                                                                                     (1) 
Here ‘ht’ represents the level of human capital possessed by the adult. So here parental human 
capital is one of the determinants of human capital of the child. ‘st’ is the time devoted by the 
child to study, b>0 is a positive constant representing education technology and h		represents 
the minimum level of human capital achieved by a child even if she does not attend school( 
i.e. st=0).Thus ht+1>0 even if st =0. 
When adults work in unskilled sector, the household income is given by: 
Yt = [A+ (1- st-1)h ]+Aφ (1-st ) ,                                                                                          (2) 
where Yt is total income of the household, A is wage earned by the adult in unskilled sector, 
(1- st-1)h is the positive learning by doing effect, φ is the fraction of adult wage that a child 
labour receives. Here 0<φ<1 is a positive constant. 
The household spends its income on purchasing consumption good and schooling of the 
child. So, the budget constraint of the household is given by: 
 [A+ (1- st-1)h ]+ Aφ (1-st ) = pcct +ρ st ,                                                                                (3)                                
where pc is the price of the consumption good, pcct represents the total consumption 
expenditure and ρst denotes the expenditure on schooling of the child. When adults work in 
skilled sector, household income is given by: 
                                                           
6
 Hare and Ulph (1979) assume that wage rate depends on ability and amount of education received by an individual. 
 
7
 According to Contrereas (2008), Emerson and Knabb (2006) and Galor and Tsiddon (1997), human capital of the parents 
play a crucial role in human capital development of the children. 
 
Yt = wt + Aφ (1-st ) ,                                                                                                         
where wt is the wage earned by the adult in the skilled sector. We assume wage earned in 
skilled sector (wt) is proportional to the human capital acquired by that individual i.e. wt= δht. 
Utility function of an adult of the representative household is defined as follows: 
Ut = ln (ct -c) + β ln [f δ (bstht +h  ) + (1-f) {A+ (1- st)h}],                                                     (4) 
where ct represents consumption,	c represents subsistence consumption. The utility function is 
defined on the range ct≥c. Adult believes that the probability of the child getting job in skilled 
sector is f (present employment rate of skilled sector). δ (bstht +h ) is the return that the child 
may get as an adult if he gets job in the skilled sector. Adult believes that the probability of 
the child not getting job in skilled sector is (1-f). While modelling parental expectation, 
adaptive expectation is assumed. Parents observe present unemployment rate and expect that 
the same unemployment rate would prevail. So they believe that their children will get 
employed in skilled sector with probability f if the employment rate of skilled sector is f and 
rate of unemployment in skilled sector would be (1-f). It is assumed that whoever does not 
get job in skilled sector gets employed in unskilled sector. Unskilled sector absorbs all the 
residual labour force. So there is no possibility of remaining fully unemployed. [A + (1- 
st)h	]	is the return that the child may get as an adult if he gets job in unskilled sector. [f δ(bstht 
+h ) + (1-f) {A + (1- st)h	}] represents total expected earning of child.  
Let us first apply the model in the short run equilibrium context in case of unskilled sector 
and understand the relationship between parental human capital and schooling of the child.  
 
3. Short-run equilibrium when adults work in the unskilled sector 
Utility maximization problem of an adult of the representative household is to maximize the 
utility, given by equation (4), subject to budget constraint given by equation (3) with respect 
to the decision variables of the household, viz, ct and st. 
 From the first order conditions8of the above optimization problem, we obtain: 
st =    
{	
}{	}
	

                                                                  
(5)
 
From equation (A.2), 
 
fδbh! − 1 − fh >0 
Therefore for st >0,  
 h! > 
					
	

 = h$ 
st =1 when h! ≥ 
	[]				
	
[]
 = h' 
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 For detailed derivation please see equations (A.1) and (A.2) of Appendix.  
 
Proposition 1: If parental human capital is higher than	h' there will be no child labour and if 
initial human capital is less than h0 there will be no schooling of child.  
Differentiating st with respect to s! we get 
)
)
= 

	<0  
This implies that if schooling in one period is low, in the next period schooling will be high. 
This is because even if parents are not much educated, in expectation that their children may 
get job in the skilled sector in the future they send their children to school for higher number 
of hours. 
Now 	| 	 )
)
	 |= 

 
| )
)
	|<1 if h< 

 
We assume the minimum human capital attained by a child even if she does not attend school 
is less than a critical level (i.e. 	h< 

 ). We require this condition for convergent 
equilibrium. 
 
4. Dynamics of schooling 
At steady state, st = s!= s∗ 
So from equation (5) we get, 
s∗ = 
{	
}{	}
	
{}
 
s∗ = 0	if βfδbh! − 1 − fhA1 + φ + h − pc 	≤ 	 {fδh + 1 − fA + h}Aφ + ρ 
Sufficient condition for s∗ = 0 is A1 + φ + h − pc   < 0.This implies that the sufficient 
condition for steady state schooling to be zero is that the sum of adult’s earning, child’s 
earning and minimum level of human capital attained by the child even if she does not attend 
school must be less than the subsistence consumption expenditure of the household. 
Now intercept of st = 
{	
}{	}
	

 
> s∗ 
Necessary condition for s∗ = 1  is A − pc  >


. This condition will hold true if 
A − pc  >0 and is sufficiently high. This implies that the necessary condition for full 
schooling in steady state is that adult wage must exceed subsistence consumption expenditure 
of the household and the difference between adult wage and subsistence consumption 
expenditure must be sufficiently high. 
We assume s∗>0. Therefore intercept of st>0. 
st will thus be a downward sloping straight line with positive intercept. 
In the following diagram we show the case where 
equilibrium. We rule out the case where 
equilibrium. Only if the minimum human capital attained by a child even if she does not 
attend school is less than a critical level (i.e.
equilibrium. 
 
                                         
                                                                       
 
In Figure 1, schooling converges to steady state level 
path of schooling will be oscillating in nature.
will be oscillating but convergent in nature.
Proposition 2: In the presence of learning by doing effect the time path of schooling would 
be oscillating but convergent provided the minimum level of human 
child, even if she does not attend schoo
 
Note that9: 
i) )∗
)		
	> 0. This implies that as 
capital increases, steady state 
human capital, an increase in δ
ii) )∗
)
	< 0 if A>ρ + pcc  . This implies that if adult unskilled wage exceeds sum of the 
schooling cost and subsistence expenditure of the household then even if child wage falls, 
                                                          
9
 For detailed derivation please see equations (A.5), (A.6) (A.7), (A.8), (A.9) and (A.10) of Appendix.
 
| )
)
	|<1. Here we get a convergent 
| )
)
	| >1 because then we get a divergent 
	h< 


 ), we get the case of convergent 
 
Figure 1 
s∗over time. Since 
 We assume that | )
)
	|<1. Thus the time path 
 
capital possessed by a 
l, is less than a critical level. 
δ increases i.e. the responsiveness of skilled 
schooling also increases. As δ captures the marginal return to 
 results in an increase in steady state schooling of the child. 
)
)
 <0, the time 
wage to human 
 
 
steady state schooling of the child increases. In this case wage obtained from child work is no 
longer necessary for household. In this context, as child earns a lower proportion of the 
earning earned by the adult by working in the unskilled sector, schooling rises. This is 
because lower earnings by the child obtained by working the same number of hours induce 
the parent to reduce the working hours of the child, necessary to meet subsistence 
consumption needs and instead increase the schooling hours of the child. However if A<ρ + 
pcc  i.e. if adult unskilled wage is less than the sum of the schooling cost and subsistence 
expenditure of the household, )
∗
)
	may be >0 or < 0.This implies that with fall in child wage 
steady state schooling of the child may or may not increase. 
iii) )∗
)
	< 0. This implies that with fall in schooling cost steady state schooling increases. 
iv) )∗
)
 >0 if bht > 
	
	[]
 +  

	
 . If b or ht is very 
high, this condition is more likely to be satisfied. This implies that if education technology is 
highly efficient or parental human capital is very high, only then with increase in unskilled 
adult wage, steady state schooling will increase. Otherwise increase in unskilled adult wage 
may also lead to fall in steady state schooling. 
v) In this model 	)∗
)	
=
	{	}
{}	

6	> 0. This implies that as parental 
human capital increases, steady state schooling of child also increases. This is quite obvious. 
Parents who are more educated will care more for the education of the child. 
vi)	)∗
)
 > 0. This implies that with increase in the probability of getting employment in the 
skilled sector, steady state schooling rises. 
 
5. Comparison between the effects of ban and subsidy 
In this section we compare the effects of ban and education subsidy on steady state schooling. 
|)∗
)
|-|)∗
)
| 
=  
[	
{	}
	
{}6
 
Now A< min {(1+ρ+φ+pc), (1+β)} is the sufficient condition for |)
∗
)
| >| )∗
)
|. 
This implies that if unskilled wage is sufficiently small, education subsidy (i.e. lowering 
education cost) is more effective in enhancing steady state schooling than banning child 
labour. 
Proposition 3: If unskilled wage is sufficiently low, providing education subsidy is a better 
policy option to increase schooling than banning child labour. On the other hand if unskilled 
wage is not all that low child ban is a better policy measure to enhance schooling. 
 
 
6. Effects of ban on utility  
In this section we study the effects of ban on utility level of the household in the steady state. 
Differentiating the utility function with respect to φ we get10 
)7
)
 = 

89∗
8:
	
	;∗	
	<
;∗	
			<
 
If )
∗
)
>0, then )7
)
 >0. This possibility may arise if ρ+pc >A and ρ+pc is very high. When 
education cost and subsistence expenditure is very high a child labour ban decreases both 
steady state schooling and utility level of the household. Otherwise even if ρ+pc >A, 
)∗
)
<0. 
In that case )7
)
 may be <0 or >0. 
If )
∗
)
<0, then )7
)
 <0 if the following condition holds: 
|Aφ+ ρ )∗
)φ
fδbh! − 1 − fh1 + β| > ;s∗fδbh! − 1 − fh + fδh + 1 − fA + h<A 
So a child labour ban that increases steady state schooling may not necessarily increase utility 
level of the household. This is because due to child labour ban, when child wage i.e. φ falls, 
steady state schooling (s∗) rises. This increases utility level of the household but due to fall in 
φ, consumption level of the household falls which reduces utility level of the household. If 
the effect on consumption dominates the effect on steady state schooling, then child labour 
ban reduces utility level of the household. 
Proposition 4: A child labour ban that increases steady state schooling of the child does not 
necessarily increase utility level of the household. The overall impact of the ban depends on 
the relative strength of two opposing effects working on consumption and steady state 
schooling. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Child labour continues to remain a social evil in developing countries. At times schooling 
cost is so high that even if the parent wants her child to study she is unable to do so because 
of poor financial condition of the household. Income of the parent is often not good enough 
to meet the subsistence consumption expenditure of the household. Thus the parent needs to 
depend on earnings of the child to satisfy the subsistence requirements of the family. 
Schooling cost adds to this burden. In such a situation banning child labour may not prove to 
be a fruitful solution to the problem. Instead subsidization of education may provide some 
relief to a poor parent and may act as an incentive to send her chid to school. 
This paper builds an overlapping generations model of household economy consisting of a 
skilled sector and an unskilled sector. If one individual is employed in skilled sector she gets 
wage proportional to human capital whereas unskilled sector gives a fixed return and a 
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positive learning by doing effect generated from working in her childhood. Expected future 
earning of child is included in the parental utility function. Parental choice of schooling vis-a-
vis child work is considered. Human capital accumulation of the child depends on time 
devoted to schooling by the child and parental level of human capital. We consider the case 
where parents work in unskilled sector. This paper attempts to understand the effects of child 
labour ban and education subsidy on steady state schooling of child labour and effects of ban 
on utility level of the household. Moreover this paper studies the relative effectiveness of 
child labour ban and education subsidy in improving schooling of the child.  
We find that steady state schooling increases with increase in the responsiveness of skilled 
wage to human capital, increase in parental level of human capital, increase in the probability 
of getting employment in the skilled sector, fall in schooling cost. As child wage falls, steady 
state schooling increases only if unskilled adult wage exceeds the sum of subsistence 
consumption expenditure and schooling cost of the household. Otherwise fall in child wage 
may or may not increase steady state schooling of the child. While analysing the dynamics 
we find that in the presence of learning by doing effect on unskilled income the time path of 
schooling is oscillating but convergent. Comparing the effects of ban and education subsidy 
on steady state schooling we get the result that if unskilled adult wage is sufficiently small, 
education subsidy is more effective in enhancing schooling than banning child labour. A 
child labour ban that increases steady state schooling may not necessarily increase utility 
level of the household. 
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Appendix 
The optimization problem of the household is to maximize 
Z = 
 
ln(ct -c) + β ln [fδ(bstht +h) + (1-f) {A+ (1- st)h}] + λ  [{A+ (1- st-1)h }+ Aφ (1-st )- pcct -ρ 
st ] 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The decision variables of the household are ct and st .The 
first order conditions for maximization of utility are given by:  
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From (A.1) and budget constraint [A+ (1- st-1)h ] + Aφ (1-st ) = pcct +ρ st ,we get 
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From (A.1) and (A.2) 
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Substituting the value of ct and putting st= st+1= s∗ in the utility function we get 
Ut = ln[
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Now differentiating the utility function with respect to φ we get 
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